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  hat does attribution mean in cyberspace? Is attribution of a cyberattack 
required by international law? When hackers use cyberspace to engage in 
espionage or cyber theft or disrupt valuable infrastructure, how can we know 
whether those acts should be attributed to a State? What are the legal conse-
quences of attribution? At international law, we might expect that attribution 
requirements are significant in framing the legal responsibility of States and 
the boundaries of responsive actions by victim States. As it turns out, how-
ever, there is little international law of cyber attribution, and what law there 
is exists largely by implication. Likewise, there is only a murky and highly 
contested law of State responsibility that theoretically constrains the vast ma-
jority of State-sponsored cyberattacks.  
For example, a State that has suffered a cyberattack may want to respond 
in kind with countermeasures. Because victim States cannot engage in coun-
termeasures unless they attribute a cyberattack to a State, attribution can 
serve simultaneously to constrain and empower a victim State. However, the 
lack of a common understanding about whether cyber attribution is re-
quired—much less what evidence suffices for attribution of a cyberattack for 
international law purposes—combined with the absence of consensus legal 
rules to limit cyber intrusions, has helped render the entire international legal 
response to cyberattacks weak and largely ineffective. Going forward, States 
and the international community should support public cyber attributions 
and address in a sustained manner what legal or evidentiary standards must 
be met to attribute responsibility for a cyberattack to a State. A viable cyber 
attribution regime is a missing but key component for States to overcome 
the Wild West cyber environment that we live in. 
In the decade since the 2010 Stuxnet and Olympic Games cyberattacks 
on a thousand Iranian nuclear centrifuges first brought to the world’s atten-
tion that cyber tools could be weaponized to cause considerable destructive 
harm,1 a long list of apparently State-sponsored cyberattacks have ricocheted 
 
1. Marc Ambinder, Did America’s Cyber Attack on Iran Make Us More Vulnerable?, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 5, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/did-
americas-cyber-attack-on-iran-make-us-more-vulnerable/258120/ (calling the U.S. cyberat-
tack a “history-making development” and “the most sophisticated state-sponsored cyber 













across the globe.2 Despite their impact—sometimes destructive (Stuxnet) 
and perhaps strategic game-changers (2016 election interference), at other 
times merely disruptive but costly (Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
and Sony Pictures hacks)—little has been done to bring legal consequences 
to bear for what in a kinetic realm would likely be unlawful acts at interna-
tional law. Over the last decade, at least thirty-eight States—including Russia, 
China, North Korea, Iran, the United Kingdom, and the United States—
have allegedly carried out or supported significant cyberattacks that impacted 
governments, populations, and infrastructures.3 The accused States, effec-
tively hiding behind nameless agents, deny the accusations, blame someone  
 
2. See Council on Foreign Relations, Cyber Operations Tracker (2020), https://microsites-
live-backend.cfr.org/cyber-operations; see also Significant Cyber Incidents, CSIS, https:// 
www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents (last 
visited July 13, 2021); Catalin Cimpanu, A Decade of Hacking: The Most Notable Cyber-Security 
Events of the 2010s, ZD NET (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-decade-of-
hacking-the-most-notable-cyber-security-events-of-the-2010s/ (detailing forty-three cyber 
security breaches that occurred between 2010 and 2019, including State-sponsored cyberat-
tacks and hacks attributable to individuals). 
3. See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 2; see also Significant Cyber Incidents, supra 
note 2; John S. Davis II et al., Stateless Attribution: Towards International Accountability for Cyber-
space, RAND (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2081.html; Dan 
Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and 
Subsequent State Practice, 112 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 583, 594 (2018) 
(eleven case studies of State-sponsored cyber operations). The total number of accusations, 











else, or decline to comment.4 They show few signs of changing behavior.5 
Gradually, some States have begun to publicly attribute cyberattacks 
against them, usually without accompanying evidence. Extensive cyberat-
tacks in Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Kyrgyzstan in 2009 were 
widely suspected as being perpetrated by Russia, yet none of them were pub-
licly attributed.6 The United States broke the attribution silence episodically. 
In 2014 the Justice Department indicted7 five People’s Liberation Army of-
ficers on economic espionage charges. Unsurprisingly, at least in part be-
cause the suspects could not be brought to trial in the United States and 
because the Chinese government understood that the threat of prosecution 
was empty,8 the attributions did not include evidentiary support, and the 
 
4. Przemysław Roguski, Russian Cyber Attacks Against Georgia, Public Attributions and Sov-
ereignty in Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69019/ 
russian-cyber-attacks-against-georgia-public-attributions-and-sovereignty-in-cyberspace/ 
(citing twenty States accusing Russia of cyber operations against Georgia as evidence that 
“more—especially European—States are willing to adopt public attributions”); see also Da-
vid E. Sanger & Marc Santora, U.S. and Allies Blame Russia for Cyberattack on Republic of Georgia, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/world/eu-
rope/georgia-cyberattack-russia.html (“Neither the United States nor its allies released any 
evidence used to establish how they tied the attacks to the G.R.U. That made it easier for 
the Russian Foreign Ministry to deny that Moscow was behind the assault.”); Davis II et al., 
supra note 3, at 2; Thomas Grove & Ann M. Simmons, Russian Agency at Center of U.S. Hacking 





5. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Uncomfortable Questions in the Wake of Russia Indictment 2.0 and 
Trump’s Press Conference With Putin, LAWFARE (July 16, 2018), https://www.lawfare-
blog.com/uncomfortable-questions-wake-russia-indictment-20-and-trumps-press-confer-
ence-putin. The United States and China did reach an understanding in 2015 prohibiting 
commercial cyber espionage following the U.S. indictment of five People’s Liberation Army 
officers for such behavior. China’s commitment, however, appears to have been more a 
response to domestic politics, and was—in any case—short-lived. 
6. Andrzej Kozlowski, Comparative Analysis of Cyberattacks on Estonia, Georgie and Kyrgyz-
stan, 3 EUROPEAN SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL 237, 242–243 (2014); John Markoff, Before the Gun-
fire, Cyberattacks, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 12, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/ 
08/13/technology/13cyber.html. 
7. Jack Goldsmith & Robert D. Williams, The Failure of the United States’ Chinese-Hacking 
Indictment Strategy, LAWFARE (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/failure-united-
states-chinese-hacking-indictment-strategy; Jonathan Kaiman, China Reacts Furiously to US 
Cyber-Espionage Charges, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2014/may/20/china-reacts-furiously-us-cyber-espionage-charges. 











cyberattacks continued unabated, following additional indictments in 2017 
and 2018.9 
Outside the United States, some efforts at public attributions of cyberat-
tacks began after a 2017 global ransomware attack. WannaCry malware rap-
idly spread to over 230,000 computers across more than 150 countries in 
May of 2017 and wreaked havoc on the U.K. healthcare system.10 Disguised 
within a phishing email, once the ransomware infected a computer it worked 
to encrypt files and prevent the file owners from accessing the encrypted 
data unless they paid $300 in Bitcoin.11 In the United Kingdom, affected 
hospitals had to cancel thousands of medical appointments, and a large num-
ber of ambulances and patients were diverted from accident and emergency 
departments that were rendered unable to treat patients as a result of the 
attack.12 Other notable targets of the attack include the Russian Interior Min-
istry, a local authority in Sweden, and a number of large firms and companies 
in Spain, France, Portugal, and the United States.13 The ransomware, built to 
exploit a weakness in Microsoft systems that the National Security Agency 
(NSA) had previously identified, employed stolen NSA tools that had been 
posted online for free public download by a group called the “Shadow Bro-
kers.”14  
The United States response to WannaCry exemplified a State employing 
domestic criminal prosecution alongside sanctions to back up a public attrib-
ution of cyberattack. While press reports indicating that North Korea was 
responsible were quick to follow the attack, the official attributions took 
months.15 In October 2017 British Minister of Security Ben Wallace, without 
 
9. Goldsmith & Williams, supra note 7.  
10. Matt Reynolds, Ransomware Attack Hits 200,000 Computers Across the Globe, NEW SCI-
ENTIST (May 15, 2017), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2130983-ransomware-at-
tack-hits-200000-computers-across-the-globe/; see also National Audit Office, Investigation: 
WannaCry Cyber Attack and the NHS (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/10/Investigation-WannaCry-cyber-attack-and-the-NHS.pdf.  
11. Massive Ransomware Infection Hits Computers in 99 Countries, BBC (May 13, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39901382. 
12. National Audit Office, supra note 10. 
13. Massive Ransomware Infection Hits Computers in 99 Countries, supra note 11. 
14. Id. 
15. The New York Times purported to cite intelligence officials who felt that North Ko-
rea was responsible as soon as three days following the attack. Nicole Perlroth & David E. 
Sanger, In Computer Attacks, Clues Point to Frequent Culprit: North Korea, NEW YORK TIMES 












sharing any evidence, told the BBC that North Korea was responsible.16 By 
mid-December, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Japan issued coordinated statements attributing the WannaCry 
actions to North Korea.17 In a press briefing, White House Homeland Secu-
rity Advisor Thomas Bossert stated that the United States “do[es] not make 
this allegation lightly. We do so with evidence, and we do so with partners.”18 
No affirmative actions were taken until June 2018, when the United States 
brought criminal charges against North Korean citizen Park Jin Hyok, who 
was alleged to be a member of “a government-sponsored hacking team.”19 
Hyok was charged with working for “a North Korean government front 
company . . . to support the [North Korean] government’s malicious cyber 
actions,” which included those of WannaCry.20 Three months after the 
charges were brought, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Hyok.21 
 
16. Dan Bilefsky, Britain Says North Korea Was Behind Cyberattack on Health Service, NEW 
YORK TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/europe/uk-
ransomware-hack-north-korea.html. 
17. Thomas P. Bossert, It’s Official: North Korea Is Behind WannaCry, WALL STREET JOUR-
NAL (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/its-official-north-korea-is-behind-
wannacry-1513642537; Press Release, U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign Of-
fice Minister Condemns North Korean Actor for WannaCry Attacks (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-condemns-north-korean-
actor-for-wannacry-attacks; Greta Bossenmaier, Communications Security Establishment, 
CSE Statement on the Attribution of WannaCry Malware, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (Dec. 19, 
2017), https://cse-cst.gc.ca/en/information-and-resources/announcements/cse-statement 
-attribution-wannacry-malware (noting Canada’s agreement with attribution of WannaCry 
to North Korea); Joint Media Release, Australia Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Attributing 
the ‘WannaCry’ Ramsomware to North Korea (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.foreignminis-
ter.gov.au/minister/julie-bishop/media-release/attributing-wannacry-ramsomware-north-
korea; New Zealand Concerned at North Korean Cyber Activity, NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY 
CENTRE (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ncsc.govt.nz/newsroom/new-zealand-concerned-
at-north-korean-cyber-activity/; Press Release, The U.S. Statement on North Korea’s 
Cyberattacks, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Dec. 20, 2017), https:// 
www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001850.html. 
18. White House, Press Briefing on the Attribution of the WannaCry Malware Attack 
to North Korea (Dec. 19, 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-state-
ments/press-briefing-on-the-attribution-of-the-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea-
121917/.  
19. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Park Jin Hyok, No. MJ 18-1479 (C.D. Cal. 
June 8, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download. 
20. Id. 
21. Press Release, Treasury Targets North Korea for Multiple Cyber-Attacks, U.S. DE-












The following year, Treasury sanctioned additional North Korean entities 
for their involvement in the WannaCry attacks.22  
In June 2017 the NotPetya cyberattack encrypted computers’ master 
boot records and struck Ukraine before spreading worldwide, impacting ma-
jor companies and causing $10 billion in damages.23 Ukraine first accused 
Russia of responsibility in July 2017, and the United Kingdom and the 
United States specifically attributed NotPetya to the Russian military in 
2018.24 Also, in 2018, the United States and European governments coordi-
nated to attribute to the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) a se-
ries of cyberattacks against entities investigating Russian misdeeds, including 
the poisoning of a former Russian spy, the shooting down of Malaysia Air-
lines Flight MY17, and hacking U.S. and international anti-doping agencies.25 
Russia denied involvement in each instance.26 
Part II of this article will briefly explain what makes cyber attribution 
challenging. Part III uses examples to tell the story. Part IV reviews the 
evolving technical and practical obstacles to timely attribution. Parts V–VII 
will show that sparse cyber attribution doctrine is part of a generally anemic 
and incomplete set of secondary international law principles that fail to pro-
vide a normative structure for cyber relations between States. The same in-
completeness characterizes the law governing victim State responses, con-
sidered next. Among other shortcomings, there is little clarity on a standard 
 
22. Press Release, Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber 
Groups, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Sept. 13, 2019), https://home.treasury. 
gov/news/press-releases/sm774. 
23. Nicole Perlroth et al., Cyberattack Hits Ukraine Then Spreads Internationally, NEW YORK 
TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/ransomware-
hackers.html. 
24. White House, Statement from the Press Secretary (Feb. 15, 2018), https:// 
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-25/.  
25. David E. Sanger et al., Russia Targeted Investigators Trying to Expose Its Misdeeds, Western 
Allies Say, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/us/ 
politics/russia-hacks-doping-poisoning.html. 
26. Former Russian Spy Poisoned by Nerve Agent on Door of Home in England, Police Say, 
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/29/ex-russian-spy-skripal-poisoned-by-nerve-
agent-on-door-of-home.html (last visited July 13, 2021); Opinion, Peeling Away Russia’s Lies 
About the Downed Malaysia Airlines Flight, WASHINGTON POST (June 20, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/peeling-away-russias-lies-
about-the-downed-malaysia-airlines-flight/2019/06/20/611a7a1c-92b6-11e9-aadb-
74e6b2b46f6a_story.html; Russian Envoy Rejects Reports of Cybercrimes, ASSOCIATED PRESS 













of proof that States should meet in attributing a cyberattack to another State. 
While some States are taking steps to attribute significant cyberattacks, these 
accusations bring little or no legal consequences. Further, most of the world 
has not bothered with attribution, and the result is a combination of Wild 
West virtual landscape and a lot of cat and mouse games. The article will 
conclude in part VIII by reviewing reforms that could improve cyber attrib-
ution by tethering it more concretely to international law. 
 
II. WHAT MAKES CYBER ATTRIBUTION CHALLENGING? 
 
The international law on State responsibility specifies that attribution is “the 
operation of attaching a given action or omission to a State.”27 Although the 
technical capabilities for cyber attribution—identifying the machine or IP 
address of the attacking machine—have improved considerably in recent 
years, the law of cyberattack attribution has remained mostly undefined for 
various reasons. 
One reason is continuing uncertainties and delays in achieving attribu-
tions. Attackers complicate attributions by deliberately obscuring their iden-
tities or by staging their cyberattacks to appear as though they were caused 
by someone else. Even with recent advances, knowing the machines or IP 
addresses responsible for the hack is often difficult, costly, and time-con-
suming, and knowing those things does not necessarily lead easily to the re-
sponsible State. Technical and on-the-ground intelligence and police work 
are often necessary to establish reliable attribution. Even extensive efforts 
do not always produce unequivocal proof.28  
Apart from identifying the responsible actor, attribution has also failed 
to coalesce on what proof should suffice for cyberattack attribution, whether 
attributions should be public, and what consequences should follow from a 
successful attribution. More fundamentally, the lack of consensus on stand-
ards of proof, public attributions, and the legal consequences of attribution 
 
27. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 2, cmt. ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
2001/Add.1 (Part 2), https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_56_10 
.pfd; see also Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Beyond Naming and Shaming: Accusations 
and International Law in Cybersecurity, 31 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 969, 
985–90 (2020). 
28. Good background on the technical challenges of attribution may be found in 
Thomas Rid & Ben Buchanan, Attributing Cyber Attacks, 38 JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUD-











have stymied efforts to clarify what international legal rules apply when cyber 
operations target civilians and their infrastructure below the use of force 
threshold and outside of armed conflicts. 
As a result, some States use cyber tools to strike with impunity, knowing 
(or at least strongly suspecting) that their digital attacks will either not 
prompt a response or lead to a response that is no more than the “naming 
and shaming” that goes on in the diplomatic world and in the media. Mean-
while, the threats to infrastructure and extraction of data and intellectual 
property by cyber means continue at great cost to governments and private 
industry. We now know that increasingly sophisticated forms of offensive 
hacking are capable of causing more significant harm, even catastrophic 
damage, such as shutting down financial systems, sabotaging critical infra-
structure, and scrambling communications.29 These continuing threats make 
knowing and attributing the source of the cyber intrusion especially im-
portant so that States and the international community can respond accord-
ingly. 
In addition, the inability to identify the source of a cyberattack potentially 
increases the risks of confusion and escalation. When the United States re-
leased an unclassified summary of its Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 
in September 2018, attention focused on its commitment to “defend forward 
to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that 
falls below the level of armed conflict.”30 Yet some see “defending forward” 
as putting the U.S. military on an offensive, rather than defensive, footing. 
The recent shift in U.S. cyber policy deepens a cyber variant on a classic 
security dilemma between States: as one State takes steps to defend itself in 
cyberspace, it inadvertently threatens other States with what appears to be 
offensive action. In practice, “defending forward” can look like attacking 
forward to those experiencing an intrusion. One implication is an increased 
 
29. See, e.g., Jordan Robertson & Michael Riley, Mysterious ’08 Turkey Pipeline Blast Opened 
New Cyberwar, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2014-12-10/mysterious-08-turkey-pipeline-blast-opened-new-cyberwar; 10 Catastrophic 
Cyberattacks From 2019, ARTIC WOLF (Dec. 23, 2019), https://arcticwolf.com/re-
sources/blog/10-catastrophic-cyberattacks-from-2019 (listing significant cyberattacks in 
2019). 













tendency to escalate conflicts.31 In an environment where escalation fears are 
on the rise, the possibility that cyber intrusions could spark destructive and 
even destabilizing conflicts between States places a premium on confident 
attribution of cyber intrusions and agreed-upon norms limiting cyber intru-
sions. 
 
III. RECENT EXAMPLES 
 
In July 2020, in the midst of the global coronavirus pandemic, the U.S., Brit-
ish, and Canadian governments accused Russia of using cyber means in at-
tempts to steal intelligence on vaccines from universities, companies, and 
other health care organizations.32 According to the NSA, the group of hack-
ers known as both APT29 and Cozy Bear (the same group implicated in the 
2016 Democratic National Committee break-ins into Democratic Party serv-
ers) attempted to exploit the chaos created by the pandemic.33 The attacks 
were, of course, conducted in secret with malware that disguised its origins. 
Despite these new public accusations, the uncertain attribution of the 
cyberattacks to Russia made it easy for Russia to deny responsibility. 
A few days later, the Justice Department accused two Chinese hackers 
of trying to acquire vaccine research on behalf of China’s intelligence ser-
vice.34 Despite the outrage expressed in some quarters that the Russians and 
Chinese would use digital tools to hack Western research into coronavirus 
vaccines, cyber experts cautioned that this form of cyber espionage—even if 
clearly attributed (it has not been)—is neither authorized nor forbidden by 
international law.35 
 
31. Ben Buchanan & Robert D. Williams, A Deepening U.S.-China Cybersecurity Dilemma, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/deepening-us-china-cybersecu-
rity-dilemma; Robert Chesney, An American Perspective on a Chinese Perspective on the Defense 
Department’s Cyber Strategy and ‘Defending Forward,’ LAWFARE (Oct. 23, 2018), https:// 
www.lawfareblog.com/american-perspective-chinese-perspective-defense-departments-cy 
ber-strategy-and-defending-forward. 
32. Julian E. Barnes, Russia is Trying to Steal Virus Vaccine Data, Western Nations Say, NEW 
YORK TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/us/politics/vaccine-
hacking-russia.html. 
33. Id. 
34. Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Accuses Hackers of Trying to Steal Coronavirus Vaccine Data for 
China, NEW YORK TIMES (July 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/us/pol-
itics/china-hacking-coronavirus-vaccine.html.  
35. In contrast, an executive order issued by President Trump in 2020 confers on the 












Meanwhile, in late June and early July of 2020 explosions did significant 
damage to advanced nuclear centrifuges at Natanz in Iran.36 It remains un-
clear whether the destruction was caused by an explosive device planted in 
the heavily guarded facility or was instead the product of a cyberattack that 
triggered a gas line explosion. Although Iranian officials and many in the 
media assumed that Israel was behind this latest attack on the Iranian nuclear 
initiative, Israel denied involvement.37 Like the 2010 Stuxnet malware, the 
2020 attacks on Iranian centrifuges may have constituted a use of force at 
international law, and thus a clearer assignment of the rights and responsi-
bilities of the involved States, whichever they turn out to be, is needed.38 In 
any case, the absence of agreed-upon standards for attribution means that 
the perpetrator will not suffer legal consequences. 
Around the same time, despite years of fears about potential life-threat-
ening cyberattacks from Russia, Iran, or North Korea that could resemble a 
“cyber 9/11” or “cyber Pearl Harbor,” the first cyberattack directly linked to 
a death came from common criminals. In September 2020 an ailing woman 
was turned away from a hospital in Dusseldorf, Germany, that was in the 
grips of a ransomware attack. She died on the way to another hospital.39 
Then, further illustrating the technical and practical challenges in attrib-
uting cyberattacks, in January and February 2021 news media reported that 
Russia and China executed major cyber operations against the networks of 
U.S. companies and government agencies. Both were apparently espionage 
operations designed to give foreign intelligence agencies access to sensitive 
 
including disrupting foreign elections, energy services, or financial transactions that run di-
rectly counter to international norms that the United States has long advocated for cyber-
space. Zach Dorfman et al., Secret Trump Order Gives CIA More Powers to Launch Cyberattacks, 
YAHOO NEWS (July 15, 2020), https://www.yahoo.com/now/secret-trump-order-gives-
cia-more-powers-to-launch-cyberattacks-090015219.html. The 2020 executive order imple-
ments broad authorization provided by Congress in 2018 to give the Central Intelligence 
Agency broad powers to conduct actions in cyberspace without White House prior approval 
when targeting Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. 
36. Iran Nuclear: Natanz Fire Caused ‘Significant’ Damage, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53300579. 
37. Borzou Daragahi, Israel Speculated to be Behind Mysterious Explosion at Iranian Nuclear 
Site, INDEPENDENT (July 6, 2020), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/iran-nuclear-explosion-israel-natanz-a9603976.html. 
38. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Law and Politics of Cyberattack Attribution, 67 UCLA 
LAW REVIEW 520, 582 (2020). 













material of value to their governments. The Russian malware operation—
SolarWinds—gained access to the networks of thousands of American com-
panies and organizations and learned about supply chain vulnerabilities and 
backdoors. Through careful selection of the highest value targets, the Rus-
sians were able to remain undetected on those company networks for close 
to nine months.40  
The putative Chinese operation, known as the Microsoft Exchange hack, 
was designed to use zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange email 
servers to gain access to the email servers of tens of thousands of businesses 
and local governments. Once Chinese hackers penetrated Microsoft Ex-
change, they attacked other corporate and local government organizations. 
Those businesses and local governments were then subject to pillage and 
ransom demands by the hackers, whether the original Chinese perpetrators 
or criminals that bought into the hack.41 When Microsoft learned of the 
breach, it prepared a patch. The Chinese learned of the planned patch and 
automatically scanned the vulnerable Exchange servers before they could be 
patched.42  
The common ingredient in the recent Russian and Chinese cyberattacks 
is that U.S. intelligence agencies did not discover them until the damage was 
done. Definitive attribution of SolarWinds by U.S. officials was made in 
April 2021.43 The Biden administration formally accused the Chinese gov-
ernment of attacking the Microsoft Exchange email server software on July 
19, 2021.44  
 
40. David E. Sanger et al., White House Weighs New Cybersecurity Approach After Failure to 
Detect Hacks, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/ 
14/us/politics/us-hacks-china-russia.html. 
41. Nicholas Weaver, The Microsoft Exchange Hack and the Great Email Robbery, LAWFARE 
(Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/microsoft-exchange-hack-and-great-email-
robbery.  
42. Sanger et al., supra note 40. 
43. On April 15, 2021, the White House attributed the SolarWinds cyberattack to the 
Russian foreign intelligence service and announced the official response. White House, Fact 
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Lacking an international legal regime for attribution and thus for State 
responsibility, in recent years victim States have often retaliated for cyber 
intrusions with their own cyberattacks. For example, experts and U.S. gov-
ernment officials believe that as retaliation for suspected U.S. and Israeli 
cyberattacks, Iran has targeted American financial institutions, a major Las 
Vegas casino, a dam in the New York City suburbs, and the water supply 
system in Israel.45 There has been no formal attribution of these attacks by 
Iran, just as the attacks on Iranian centrifuges were not attributed. 
 
IV. ATTRIBUTION OBSTACLES—TECHNICAL AND PRACTICAL 
 
As recently as 2010, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn be-
moaned the difficulties in attributing cyberattacks and wrote that “[t]he fo-
rensic work necessary to identify an attack may take months, if identification 
is possible at all.”46 By 2012 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta declared that 
the United States had made “significant advances” in cyber attribution and 
that “potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the 
capacity to locate them and to hold them accountable for their actions.”47 In 
September 2018 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence de-
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SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange attacks were not even detected by U.S. 
intelligence agencies for as long as nine months (SolarWinds),49 and official 
attribution of SolarWinds was not announced until April 2021.50  
In general, significant technological strides in attributing cyber events in 
the last decade have made the attribution task “more nuanced, more com-
mon, and more political than has typically been acknowledged.”51 The nu-
ance involves combining experienced and disciplined technical operators 
with the intuition and judgment of intelligence professionals. The political 
aspect includes assessing what is at stake in making the attribution judgment, 
starting with the damage incurred, whether physical, financial, or reputa-
tional.52 A prime example is the U.S. attribution of Russian interference in 
the 2016 election. Although an official attribution was made public in the 
last days of the Obama administration, more detailed and evidence-based 
attributions accumulated in U.S. intelligence agencies and Congress through 
President Trump’s first term, culminating in the August 2020 release of a 
lengthy report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence detailing the 
Russian cyber intrusions.53 As the 2016 election interference example illus-
trates, attribution is often expressed in degrees of certainty. It requires input 
from a range of actors and sources, including technical forensics, human in-
telligence, signals intelligence, history, and diplomatic relations.54 
The declassified Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 
Recent US Elections” reminds us that intelligence analysis of cyber intrusions 
 
our allies, we have improved our collective ability to detect those responsible for malign 
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seeks “to reduce the uncertainty surrounding foreign activities, capabilities, 
or leaders’ intentions.”55 This objective is difficult to achieve when seeking 
to understand complex issues on which foreign actors go to extraordinary 
lengths to hide or obfuscate their activities.56 The intelligence community 
assessment reflects “a series of judgments that describe whether [the intru-
sion] was an isolated incident, who was the likely perpetrator, the perpetra-
tor’s possible motivations, and whether a foreign government had a role in 
ordering or leading the operation.”57 
At least in the most advanced States digital forensics and threat intelli-
gence have evolved to the point that quick and reliable attribution of the 
machines responsible for cyber intrusions is the norm.58 Of course, attribu-
tion in cyber is only possible if the attacks are detected. The SolarWinds and 
Microsoft Exchange hacks avoided sophisticated NSA detection capabilities 
by launching their tools from inside the United States, where NSA does not 
operate. At the same time, the advances in technical attribution may be 
matched by advances in the cyber attackers’ capabilities to hide their identi-
ties, leading to an unending cat-and-mouse game.59 Thus, identifying the per-
sons, organizations, or States that are legally responsible for a cyberattack 
remains challenging.60 The problems derive from technical means of decep-
tion and anonymity, but they are also due to the vagaries of the process of 
fixing responsibility for cyberattacks within the international community and 
the malleability and open-endedness of the few attribution rules that cur-
rently exist in international law.61  
In the aggregate, understanding the technical and practical components 
of attribution is essential but not sufficient for shaping a legal and policy 
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strategy to deter harmful but below the use of force threshold for cyber in-
trusions in the future. Meanwhile, as cyber intrusions have proliferated in 
recent years, and despite the absence of a durable legal regime that punishes 
malevolent cyber intrusions, many States have invested in doing attribution 
well and, as a result, deterring or at least discouraging States and other cyber 
intruders. When attribution is done badly or not at all, States lose credibility 
and likely effectiveness in dealing with those who would harm the State and 
its citizens. These risks hold for State-on-State interactions across the spec-
trum of cyber operations—from espionage to destructive attacks on infra-
structure. Yet even persuasive attribution does not make up for the absence 
of cyber-specific legal norms specifying what constitutes adequate attribu-
tion at international law. Nor have the technical advances in cyber attribution 
led to emerging cyber law in the area of State responsibility. 
 
V. A PATH TO LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR CYBER ATTRIBUTION? 
 
When the international community recognized nearly two decades ago that 
cyberattacks were becoming a new form of State-on-State warfare, govern-
ment lawyers were challenged either to fit cyber conflict into the paradigm 
of kinetic war and armed conflict or to develop a new set of rules for cyber. 
The United States and its allies sought to reassure the international commu-
nity that the jus ad bellum and jus in bello frameworks for kinetic warfare could 
and would provide an effective overlay for the new era of cyber warfare.62 
Over the last two decades, governments and scholars labored over the nu-
ances in deciding when a cyberattack might amount to a use of force or 
armed attack and, thus, whether international humanitarian law applies in the 
cyber domain. When cyber weapons cause destruction or injury, the kinetic 
model works reasonably well in the cyber realm. However, because the vast 
majority of cyberattacks have less than destructive impacts, the law for con-
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trolling the vast majority of cyberattacks has foundered in the underdevel-
oped international law of State responsibility, sovereignty, countermeasures, 
and retorsion. 
The law of State responsibility has long been an underdeveloped area of 
international law, even before layering on the cybersecurity context.63 The 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts are not codified, but many of its provi-
sions reflect widely accepted customary international law.64 The Draft Arti-
cles provide helpful and adequate guidance on when States may attribute 
cyberattacks to another State, including in situations where a State has exer-
cised “effective control” over the cyber actions of a private actor.65 
Unfortunately, the Draft Articles and customary international law are 
less helpful in prescribing the law of State responsibility that would say when 
States are required to attribute cyberattacks to another State.66 Some States 
have taken tentative steps toward advancing a legal framework for cyber at-
tribution and the attendant State responsibility. For example, the United 
States has suggested that certain cyber operations, such as the 2015 Sony 
hack67 and 2016 election interference, violated “established international 
norms.”68 Of course, the U.S. statements are silent on which norms it be-
lieves were violated. Nor do the supposed norm violations carry with them 
any consequences.  
Nonetheless, the U.S. accusations also served as an invitation to other 
like-minded States to express similar views on the appropriate norms of be-
havior. In the case of U.S. accusations about Russian election interference, 
foreign and security ministers from the G7 subsequently issued a joint state-
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ment denouncing foreign attempts to interfere in democratic processes, in-
cluding “through cyber-enabled activities.”69 That norm was then endorsed 
by over one thousand governments, firms, universities, and civil society in-
stitutions who have signed the French government-led Paris Call for Trust and 
Security in Cyberspace.70 
While States have continued mostly to muddle through their responses 
to cyberattacks, several scholars and groups of international lawyers have 
urged the adoption of norms that could be embraced by States in their public 
or non-public attributions of cyberattacks. For example, a 2015 consensus 
report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security 
recommended norm candidates for good state cyber behavior,71 and a set of 
best practices was promulgated by the Organization of Security and Coop-
eration in Europe in 2016.72 
Several scholars evaluated alleged cyberattacks by Russia in the 2016 U.S. 
election and North Korea in the WannaCry malware attack in 2017. They 
accused both States of international law violations based on attribution that 
may be surmised from publicly available sources.73 Even when not formal-
ized or documented by States accusing other States of international law vio-
lations, attributions of cyberattacks and associated violations of international 
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law in press briefings or diplomatic notes, or even media reports and schol-
arly analyses, can give rise to State practice that over time may develop as 
customary international law.74 
At the same time, the informal accusations and claims of State attribution 
for a cyberattack can, by their public nature, serve to limit the chances that 
the offending State’s behavior will be recognized as lawful. Good examples 
include Estonia’s claims of Russian responsibility for the 2007 cyberattacks 
against Estonian government and private sector infrastructure, President 
Obama’s criticisms of Chinese cyber-espionage,75 the public claims by the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia that North Korea was respon-
sible for WannaCry, and the Obama administration’s criticisms of Russian 
election interference in 2016.76 
Of course, public attribution brings along with it knowledge of the vic-
tim State’s vulnerabilities. States will, of course, avoid advertising how to 
steal their protected data or shut down their electric grid. As such, attribution 
may be provided in only general terms. Similarly, the United States and other 
States tailor attribution to protect intelligence sources and methods. Because 
a major part of attributing a cyberattack involves human and technical intel-
ligence work, States will work to preserve the anonymity of the intelligence 
so that it may be used again. 
Despite the sporadic positive steps taken by some States to attribute 
cyberattacks, the public attributions over the past decade have not been tied 
to law violations. States typically accuse the attributed State of bad behavior 
(“malicious”)77 or of violating some normative standard,78 without specifying 
which norm or ascribing consequences for the violation. An especially col-
orful attribution of a cyberattack was President Obama’s reference to the 
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Sony Pictures hack as an act of “cyber vandalism”—an apt description of 
what the North Koreans did, perhaps, but a phrase utterly without normative 
or legal grounding.79 While the United Kingdom accused the Russian GRU 
of international law violations in several of its cyberattacks directed at Brit-
ain, Ukraine, and the United States, it declined to say which laws were broken 
in any specific operation.80  
 
VI. BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CASE FOR STATE                       
RESPONSIBILITY IN BELOW-THRESHOLD CYBERATTACKS 
 
The Wild West environment for cyber exploitation persists in part because 
of a lack of agreed-upon and enforceable rules for attributing cyber intru-
sions to the responsible actor and then punishing the wrongdoing. Without 
attribution rules and practices that are transparent and widely shared, there 
is no incentive for attackers to stop what they are doing. Because cyber at-
tribution remains challenging and often time-consuming when State respon-
sibility is suspected, international law places States in an untenable posture 
in responding to cyber intrusions below the use of force level.  
The customary international law of State responsibility and attribution is 
largely drawn from the work of over a half-century of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) and its Articles on State Responsibility. While not bind-
ing on any nation, the ILC articles were commended to member States by 
the United Nations General Assembly in 2012 and have been cited repeat-
edly by courts, tribunals, and other bodies.81 The unsurprising threshold un-
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derstanding on State responsibility is that a “State bears international respon-
sibility for a cyber-related act that is attributable to the State and that consti-
tutes a breach of an international legal obligation.”82 States should thus care 
a great deal about cyber attribution precisely because the absence of attribu-
tion precludes State responsibility.  
In addition, a persuasive case may be made that international law requires 
that States attribute internationally wrongful acts in cyberspace if they expect 
to respond in ways that would otherwise violate international law, e.g., by 
using force or engaging in countermeasures. For a use of force to be lawful, 
it must respond to an armed attack.83 If the responsive use of force is not, in 
fact, defensive, the putative victim State’s use of force would be prohibited 
by the UN Charter.84 Similarly, the Draft Articles state: “An injured State 
may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply” with its 
legal obligations.85 At least by implication, attribution of a cyberattack is re-
quired before a State may lawfully engage in countermeasures.  
Another potential contributor to international law attribution require-
ments in the cyber domain is State sovereignty. Two competing views com-
mand attention. Below the use of force threshold and absent a prohibited 
intervention, does international law bar violations of sovereignty? Or is sov-
ereignty merely a background principle that informs customary international 
law?86 Sovereignty becomes relevant and potentially important for cyber at-
tribution to the extent that a cyberattack from one State that penetrates an-
other State is viewed as an international law violation. If the incoming 
cyberattack violates a sovereignty rule, countermeasures may be available to 
the victim State and, as explained above, attribution of the attack may be 
required. In some instances, even cyber espionage may be unlawful at inter-
national law if sovereignty is treated as a rule. 
A growing number of States, including France, Austria, the Czech Re-
public, Finland, Germany, Iran, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, have 
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signed on to the view that sovereignty is violated when one State’s cyberat-
tack causes “unwelcome effects” in another State.87 Although the precise 
scope of a sovereignty rule remains unclear,88 under such a rule States are 
responsible for the wrongful cyber-related acts of their own officials, agents, 
contractors, non-State actors, and other States, to the extent they actually 
control the operations.89 States do not escape legal responsibility for inter-
nationally wrongful acts by perpetrating them through proxies. Taken to its 
logical extreme, such an approach to sovereignty could mean that virtually 
any nonconsensual cyber operation carried out by agents under the direction 
or control of one State in another State has violated sovereignty.90 In prac-
tice, however, these “purist” sovereignty States have not followed their own 
purported doctrine and have instead followed the approach to sovereignty 
set forth in a recent German government position paper, which maintains 
that “negligible physical effects and functional impairments below a certain 
impact threshold cannot—taken by themselves—be deemed to constitute a 
violation of territorial sovereignty.”91  
The United Kingdom and the United States have questioned whether 
sovereignty is itself an enforceable rule or is instead a background principle 
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that informs the content of other rules, such as the duty of non-interven-
tion.92 These disparate views on sovereignty could, in turn, lead to different 
understandings of when attribution is required. Consider the SolarWinds 
cyberattack. As has been reported, assume that the United States believes 
that the Russian government was responsible for SolarWinds. The United 
States may well wish to counter the Russian hack with an equivalent cyber 
operation targeting Russian firms. If sovereignty is an international law rule, 
Russia engaged in internationally wrongful acts and the United States is en-
titled to take countermeasures, but only if the United States attributes the 
incoming attack to the Russian government. If the Russian attack is not at-
tributed, any counter cyber operation by the United States would itself vio-
late sovereignty and international law, permitting countermeasures by Rus-
sia. If, instead, sovereignty is a background principle and not law, SolarWinds 
is not an internationally wrongful act, and neither attribution nor counter-
measures are required.93 
By implication, States that view sovereignty as a background principle 
and not enforceable international law could argue reasonably that many of 
its cyber actions—such as the United States’ responses to SolarWinds—are 
retorsion and thus need not be preceded by attribution of the incoming 
cyberattack to a State.94 For the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
defend forward and persistent engagement policies of actively pursuing 
cyber attackers globally do not require attribution of cyberattacks to a State 
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because below threshold attacks are not internationally wrongful acts. Mean-
while, as noted above, other States may consider such operations violations 
of their sovereignty.95 
Beyond the overarching debate on sovereignty, cyberattacks that are “co-
ercive” may also violate international law. Outside an armed conflict, inter-
national law forbids cyber intrusions that violate the prohibition on inter-
vention.96 Based on the principle of sovereignty, but different from it, the 
non-intervention principle forbids coercive intervention by cyber means.97 
The consensus among experts is that State-on-State cyber intrusions that are 
not coercive but are “detrimental, objectionable, or otherwise unfriendly” 
are not international legal violations.98 As confirmed by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua judgment, “the element of coercion . 
. . forms the very essence of . . . prohibited intervention.”99 Yet, international 
law has never had a precise definition of coercion. According to a consensus 
among the cyber experts who contributed to Tallinn 2.0, “coercion is not 
limited to physical force, but rather refers to an affirmative act designed to 
deprive another State of its freedom of choice . . . to force that State to act 
in an involuntary manner or involuntarily refrain from acting in a particular 
way.”100 A State compels another State by, for example, providing cyber 
training or supplying malware to a private group operating in the compelled 
State.101 
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Defining the range of cyber conduct that qualifies as “coercion” has been 
more difficult. The International Group of Experts (IGE) that provided the 
analysis in Tallinn 2.0 could only agree on the anodyne statement “that as a 
general matter, States must act as reasonable States would in the same or 
similar circumstances when considering responses to them.”102 
In a November 2016 speech, Department of State legal adviser Brian 
Egan opined that “a cyber operation by a State that interferes with another 
State’s ability to hold an election or that manipulates a State’s election results 
would be a clear violation of the rule of non-intervention.”103 The Tallinn 2.0 
experts similarly suggested that remotely altering electronic ballots to manip-
ulate election results constitutes unlawful intervention.104 
A January 2017 memorandum from the general counsel of the Depart-
ment of Defense to the combatant commands and other senior military and 
civilian lawyers in the Pentagon affirmed coercion as a prerequisite means 
for unlawful intervention. It concluded that military cyber activities that fall 
below the use of force threshold and do not violate the non-intervention 
principle are “largely unregulated by international law at this time.”105 
We should remain cautious about this coercion analysis, however, be-
cause State practice and resulting customary international law is based on 
examples from kinetic conflicts. The analogies to cyber are not necessarily 
conclusive. Consider Russian election interference in 2016. If we extrapolate 
from General Michael Hayden’s metaphor that the Russians effectively 
“weaponized”106 the information they stole for the purpose of eroding con-
fidence in the U.S. democratic system, the Russian exfiltration looks more 
coercive. In any case, the United States could not respond to Russia until it 
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attributed State responsibility for the attacks. An official attribution did not 
occur until January 2017, two months after the election. 
The OPM hack, for example, may have severely undermined U.S. na-
tional security at a scale not seen previously. Yet, from the perspective of 
international law, the OPM hack was an act of espionage, which international 
law either fails to regulate or affirmatively permits. As such, it is not surpris-
ing to see accusations against China avoid condemnation for the OPM hack 
in international legal terms.107 
 
VII. DEVELOPING EVIDENCE FOR ATTRIBUTION AND                            
VICTIM STATE RESPONSES 
 
An attribution of a cyberattack can lead to significant consequences for the 
perpetrator State. If a State is victimized by an internationally wrongful act 
below the use of force threshold, the victim State may be entitled to take 
countermeasures.108 Brian Egan, in his 2016 speech, stated that “the availa-
bility of countermeasures to address malicious cyber activity requires a prior 
internationally wrongful act that is attributable to another state,”109 while 
U.K. attorney general Jeremy Wright added that in carrying out counter-
measures, “the victim state must be confident in its attribution of that act to 
a hostile state before it takes action in response.”110 Countermeasures are 
victim State responses that otherwise would violate international law and are 
designed to prevent a responsible State from continuing its unlawful cyber 
intervention.111 Countermeasures require prior notice to the offending State, 
and they must have as their purpose inducing compliance with international 
law.112 Punitive countermeasures are forbidden.113  
A significant impediment to successful cybersecurity law and policy in 
international law is that no evidentiary standard for proof of attribution of 
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cyberattacks has been established or agreed upon by States.114 The ILC Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility declined to address matters of evidence and 
proof of international law violations.115 The ICJ has contributed only by sug-
gesting that such standards vary depending on the severity of the offense.116 
The complexities of cyber attribution and the risks of misattribution argue 
for a high burden of proof. Kristen Eichensehr has argued that the sliding 
scale of evidence based on the severity of the cyberattack and anticipated 
response, as justified by the ICJ and the Tallinn Manual 2.0, is helpful only at 
the extremes of the scale—a cyber armed attack.117  
For the vast majority of cyberattacks—those that could trigger counter-
measures and lesser intrusions below the use of force threshold—
Eichensehr argues that a minimum standard of some evidence may serve im-
portant purposes of promoting stability and avoiding conflict in the cyber 
domain.118 She persuasively maintains that “providing sufficient technical de-
tails to all other potential attributors . . . to confirm (or debunk) an attribution 
will bolster the attribution’s credibility.”119 Requiring that attributors “show 
their work” should lead to more careful and better attributions, too.120 
Eichensehr concludes that “all governmental attributions should provide 
sufficient evidence to allow other governmental and nongovernmental ac-
tors to confirm or debunk the attributions.”121  
States engaged in countermeasures following a cyberattack bear the bur-
den of attributing the attack they wish to counter to the responsible State.122 
In other words, the victim State must persuade other interested States that it 
was victimized by an internationally wrongful act. The evidence described 
above would accomplish that task. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 IGE opined that 
“as a general matter the graver the underlying breach . . . , the greater the 
confidence ought to be in the evidence relied upon by a State considering a 
response . . . because the robustness of permissible self-help responses . . . 
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grows commensurately with the seriousness of the breach.”123 However, ac-
cording to the IGE, the severity of the cyber intrusion directed at an injured 
State is also relevant, so that a State confronted with “low-level cyber oper-
ations that are merely disruptive” may be expected to amass more evidence 
for attribution than a State victimized by “devastating cyber operations and 
needing to respond immediately to terminate them.”124 
In a similar vein, the time it takes to produce a high confidence attribu-
tion judgment can limit the lawful responses to cyber operations. Mistaken 
attribution can lead to an unlawful response even if the State made a reason-
able attribution judgment and implemented countermeasures.125 If a State 
victimized by an internationally wrongful cyber intrusion engages in coun-
termeasures and ends up being wrong about State attribution, the victimized 
State has committed an internationally wrongful act.126 On the other hand, if 
the victim State waits until it has high confidence in its attribution of a State’s 
responsibility for the intrusion, any countermeasures may be construed as 
punishment, a form of reprisal forbidden under international law.127 As a 
result, cyber deterrence may be undermined because the legally less risky but 
weak self-help retorsion responses to an intrusion are unlikely to deter simi-
lar cyber intrusions in the future. 
Nor is the failure of a State to provide persuasive proof of attribution 
itself an internationally wrongful act. The 2015 United Nations Group of 
Governmental Experts report noted that accusations of wrongful acts by 
States “should be substantiated,”128 but the group gave no indication of 
which or how much evidence would suffice or even count. The U.S. view, 
as articulated by Brian Egan’s 2016 speech, is that “a State acts as its own 
judge of the facts and may make a unilateral determination with respect to 
attribution of a cyber operation to another State. . . . [T]here is no interna-
tional legal obligation to reveal evidence on which attribution is based prior 
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to taking appropriate action.”129 Thus, even when legally required, attribution 
need not be made public.130  
States are likewise not obligated to provide evidence of attribution when 
responding to another State’s cyber intrusions.131 While the IGE acknowl-
edged the value in such a disclosure requirement, it found insufficient State 
practice and opinio juris to recognize “an established basis under international 
law for such an obligation.”132 The IGE noted that the highly classified na-
ture of such attribution assessments is the primary reason for the absence of 
customary international law on this important point.133 Fear of reckless or 
spurious accusations is also widespread and, indeed, among the norms 
agreed to by the 2015 UN Group of Government Experts was the following: 
“accusations of organizing and implementing wrongful acts brought against 
States should be substantiated.”134 
Although attribution is necessarily probabilistic, the process serves its 
purpose if it convinces the responsible State (and victim State’s citizens) that 
a response to the cyber intrusion is called for.135 The fact that attribution 
judgments draw on many different sources of information has one major 
temporal implication—early judgments made with less information are gen-
erally less believable than later judgments made with more information.136 
Continuing investigation may reveal additional useful information, which 
may (or may not) reinforce attribution judgments made earlier.137 Over time, 
an international consensus may develop on the minimum level of involve-
ment needed to declare that a State is legally responsible for a cyberattack. 
Legally enforceable attribution proof requirements could be imposed 
only on States that have been victimized by an internationally wrongful act. 
Short of countermeasures, victim States may respond to cyber intrusions 
through retorsions, acts that are “unfriendly” but lawful.138 Examples include 
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An attribution may be celebrated by some and condemned by others. The 
OPM hack was assailed in the United States as a significant breach of na-
tional security, but Director of National Intelligence James Clapper acknowl-
edged that the Chinese behavior was acceptable among States.140 Clapper 
also opined that the United States would have done the same thing if it could. 
So the efficacy of attribution depends on its purpose, context, and audience. 
Public attribution of attacks in the cyber domain has long been thought 
to further deterrence—the exposed attackers will refrain from future at-
tacks.141 Deterrence through attribution has a poor record, however.142 Yet 
even where a public attribution does not stop cyberattacks by a perpetrator 
State, it may enable victim States to improve their cyber defenses and thus 
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deter future attacks.143 Public attribution also builds a record that may help 
legitimate cyber responses by the victim State.144 
Because of the harm that States and their citizens continue to suffer as a 
result of cyberattacks, States should agree to make some difficult tradeoffs 
between secrecy and transparency and publicly identify some public infra-
structure “red lines” and attribution benchmarks that can help create an in-
ternational law roadmap for deterrence of harmful cyber intrusions. 
As cyber international relations now stand, a few States benefit from the 
absence of express cyber norms on what suffices to attribute State responsi-
bility for cyber exploitation because they have the most offensive cyber ca-
pabilities. However, in general, those States are also the most vulnerable to 
cyber intrusions. Meanwhile, the disparity between States that are strong and 
weak at attribution results in the equivalent of an arms race between ad-
vances in detection versus detection evasion. Evasion is getting easier faster, 
so States that do not have advanced attribution capabilities can reliably invest 
in hiding themselves.145 
As the most advanced cyber States recognize the risks of cyber escala-
tion, those States have good reason to become more transparent about at-
tribution in service of the mutual restraint that could be gained by sharing 
attribution information. But to date, State concerns about revealing intelli-
gence sources and methods counsel against transparency.146 However, 
“[u]nless a nation is able to effectively redress a cyber intrusion, it can be 
harmful or self-defeating to publicize it, since public knowledge of loss and 
the failure to respond effectively invite more attacks.”147 
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Recognizing that customary international law has not developed a set of 
understandings or recognized State practice on what level of attribution is 
acceptable or necessary for establishing State responsibility for cyber actions, 
the Tallinn Manual IGE concluded that “States may agree between them-
selves to a rule of responsibility specific to a cyber act or practice.”148 The 
result would be lex specialis to the extent the rule conflicts directly with general 
principles of State responsibility.149 
States could also work collectively toward cyber attributions. In Septem-
ber 2019, twenty-seven States issued a “Joint Statement” that contemplated 
a set of unspecified collective actions with an aim to advance responsible 
state behavior in cyberspace.150 In recent years, cyberattacks including 
WannaCry, NotPetya, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons hack illustrate that collective attributions might enhance the cred-
ibility of the claims made.151 Over time a series of collective attributions 
could constitute a general practice that could be accepted as opinion juris. 
Alternatively, the creation of an international institution to impartially 
attribute cyberattacks or advocate for the application of international law to 
address such attacks might allow States to advance the power of accusa-
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State actors reluctant to share it publicly.153 This avenue has the potential to 
provide integrity to the currently muddled series of accusations and counter-
accusations that typically characterize the aftermath of cyberattacks. Such an 
entity could supplement the currently disaggregated attribution efforts, while 
providing the opportunity to strengthen and perhaps eventually supplant 
them.154 Further, such an organization could build and concentrate technical 
expertise that would be of particular benefit to States that lack the capacity 
to adequately attribute, broadening participation in the creation of new in-
ternational norms. In essence, credible reports of attribution by neutral ac-
tors could act as a catalyst for States to coalesce around new international 
legal rules proscribing the sort of cyberattacks that currently evade meaning-
ful repercussions. 
In practice, attribution of cyberattacks in the United States is determined 
if and when the Secretary of the Treasury decides, in consultation with other 
officials, to freeze the foreign actor’s U.S.-based assets. Proposals for im-
proving U.S. attribution processes include centralizing the attribution func-
tion in a single agency—likely NSA155—although the secrecy of NSA and its 
firm anchor in the U.S. government limits the attractiveness of that idea. 
Other proposals would create a National Cyber Safety Board,156 an attribu-
tion organization somewhere in the U.S. government. Such a model has 
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promise inside the United States, but a domestic process does not get at the 
international dimensions—where the problems are. 
